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Abstract—Mobile wireless sensor networks (MWSN) is a 
subdomain of wireless sensor networks in which sensors and/or 
sinks are mobile. In this study, we propose a scheme for 
providing  trajectory privacy of mobile sink nodes. The proposed 
scheme is based on random distribution of data packets. 
Moreover, sensor nodes do not use location information of the 
mobile sink or its trajectory. We performed simulation based and 
analytical performance evaluations for the proposed scheme. The 
results show that a network with up to 99% data delivery rate 
can be obtained by appropriate configuration while maintaining 
a fair level of trajectory privacy of the mobile sink node.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The advances in robotics and wireless communication 
technologies have enabled the development of new 
architectures for MWSNs which have drawn considerable 
attention from the research community in the last decade. 
MWSNs have their own unique properties such as having 
dynamic mobile network topology. Since sensor and sink nodes 
are not always in direct communication, sensor nodes should 
have the data storage capability.  These unique properties have 
brought many new security challenges. As having mobile sink 
is part of some network architectures of MWSNs, it is also a 
key player for the applications that are built on these 
architectures. For some applications, the owner and the user of 
the network are different. For instance, a set of sensors can be 
deployed on oceanic area in order to collect data about the 
geographical properties. The users of this network are oil 
companies with their own mobile collectors. Since these 
companies are competitors, they are interested in each other’s 
data collection region. Therefore, the location privacy of the 
collectors of mobile companies is a security concern. 
Drastically, the network could be a military one and the mobile 
collector could be a soldier. The interest of the attacker would 
be not only the current location of mobile sink, but also the 
patrolling trajectory. Thus, the keeping the trajectory of the 
mobile sink secret is a new security and privacy challenge 
emerged with MWSNs. 
In this study, we propose a scheme to maintain trajectory 
privacy of mobile sink for MWSNs. Although there are some 
works in the literature addressing the location privacy problem 
in MWSNs [1 2], to the best of our knowledge our proposed 
work is the first one in the literature addressing the concern of 
trajectory privacy of mobile sinks. Our scheme relies on 
homogeneously distributing the sensed data through the 
network. Our performance evaluation shows that our scheme 
supplies high data delivery rate (up to 99% for certain 
configurations). 
II. THE PROPOSED SCHEME  
The proposed scheme for preserving the trajectory privacy 
of sink nodes relies on the random forwarding of the packets 
and storing the packets in intermediate nodes with a predefined 
probability. Our scheme does not release any address 
information of the mobile sink.  
A. Threat Model 
The threat is basically mote-level such that the attacker 
cannot hear the direct communication between the mobile sink 
and the benign nodes, but can deploy it sown malicious sensor 
nodes into the network. Hence, it may at least be aware of the 
time and location of the direct communication of the mobile 
sink with its own malicious sensor nodes. Moreover, a node 
deployed by the attacker can capture packets and read the 
contexts of them. The mote-level assumption is fair enough 
since otherwise analytically no defense system can maintain the 
privacy of mobile sink node. With this assumption, attacks 
containing trace routing technique will not be sufficient since 
the route of a packet does not change with the existence of a 
mobile sink.  
B. Overview of the Scheme 
For each data collection phase, the mobile sink randomly 
selects a trajectory and travels on the selected trajectory with a 
preset constant speed. It broadcasts a beacon for every ஻ܶ, 
predetermined time for broadcasting beacon, to let the sensor 
nodes be aware of its existence. Also each sensor broadcasts 
fake beacons for every ிܶ , predetermined time for broadcasting 
fake beacon, with the probability of ிܲ , probability of sending 
fake beacon. When a node wants to store a new data packet 
(either because of generation of the data packet or receiving a 
forwarded data packet) into its buffer, it checks the volume of 
the already occupied storage; if it is equal to the buffer size of a 
sensor node, ܤ, it drops the oldest packet.  
When a sensor node generates data ܦீ , it inserts ܦீ  into its 
buffer. If ܮ , the maximum number of distinct sensor nodes 
This work was supported by the Scientific and Technological Research 
Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) under grant 110E180.  350
that keep ܦீ  in its storage, is higher than 0, then the number of 
remaining nodes to a keep copy of data, ܮோ, is set to the ܮ. The 
information of ܮோ is part of header of data packet ܦீ. Then, 
ܦீ  is forwarded to ௌܵ, the selected mobile sensor node among 
the neighbor nodes. If ܮ is zero, the mobile sensor node stores 
the generated data packet but does not forward it.  
When an intermediate node receives ܦீ  from a mobile 
sensor node ܵி, it stores ܦீ  with a predetermined probability 
value of ௦ܲ in its buffer and decrements ܮோ. ܮோ is not 
decremented if the data packet is not stored with probability 
1 െ ௌܲ. If  ܦீ  is stored and ܮோ is higher than 0, then the mobile 
sensor node selects one neighbor node ܵ௦ among its neighbors 
except ܵி and forwards ܦீ  with (possibly decremented) ܮோ 
attached to the header of ܦீ .  
The reason behind not decrementing ܮோ when ܦீ  is not 
stored is to maintain a homogenous distribution of ܦீ  in the 
entire network. By doing so, the delivery probability of 
ܦீ increases because if a mobile sensor node does not have 
chance to interact with the mobile sink node, the closer 
neighbor nodes may also have no chance to interact. The 
probability of having an interaction with the mobile sink node 
and at least one of the sensor nodes at far and different 
locations is higher. This situation is illustrated in Fig. 1.  
 
 
Fig. 1.  A local view of data distribution with ܮ ൌ 2 and ௦ܲ ൌ 0.5 
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION (SOME HIGHLIGHTS) 
We performed detailed performance evaluation of our 
scheme using both simulation (Omnet++) and analytical 
techniques. Due to space limitations in this abstract, we provide 
some highlights in this section. The meanings of the symbols 
referred in this section can be seen at Section II.  
− Data delivery rate reaches optional value (around 99%) 
when ܮ values is 10, and remains there up to ܮ ൌ 20. 
Larger ܮ values reduce the data delivery rate  (ܤ ൌ 10, 
௦ܲ ൌ 0.5). 
− ௌܲ values up to 0.5 keep data delivery rate above 98% 
(ܤ ൌ 10, ܮ ൌ 10). 
− Communication overhead, in terms of number of 
forwarded packets, increases linearly w.r.t. ܮ and other 
parameters. Thus our system is scalable. 
− With the value of ிܲ ൌ 0.015, it is possible to fully 
confuse the attacker with fake beacons. Thus ிܲ ൌ 0.015 
is optimal value. This value causes to increase the number 
of broadcasts in the network 1.5 times. 
− In our Passive Attack model, an attacker deploys its own 
static sensor nodes into the network area with its own 
generated data packets, but do not distribute these packets 
through the network. In case of receiving a data packet 
from other nodes, it is processed via proposed scheme 
principles. Here, interaction with the mobile sink gives 
exact information about the location of the mobile sink 
since the attacker's data is not distributed (thus the 
assumption not forwarding attacker's data assumption is to 
favor the attacker). We analytically show that in order to 
learn all the points in the trajectory, the expected value for 
the total number of malicious nodes that the attacker 
should deploy is equal to the number of benign nodes in 
the network.  We also show that in a case where partial 
learning the trajectory, say with rate ߚ where 0 ൏ ߚ ൏ 1, 
would suffice for the attacker, the amount of the malicious 
nodes needed to be deployed is shown to be ߚ times the 
number of benign nodes. Thus, we conclude that our 
system is fairly resilient against trajectory disclosure 
attacks.  
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
In this study, we motivate a new type of privacy challenge 
for mobile wireless sensor networks: trajectory privacy of 
mobile collector nodes. We have proposed an abstract network 
scheme with no cryptography for this problem. Our scheme is 
based on introducing randomness in data forwarding and 
storage in mobile sensor nodes with the aim of achieving 
homogeneity for data packet duplication.  
We have done a set of simulative and analytical evaluation 
against different metrics to understand the performance of the 
proposed scheme. The results show that with fine tuning of 
parameters, data delivery rate reaches up to 99%. The network 
yields a deterministic and linear communication overhead that 
can be maintained at desirable ratios. Moreover, we also 
showed that the proposed scheme fairly resists against the 
trajectory disclosure attacks.  
As future work, we plan to analyze the resiliency of our 
scheme against traffic analysis and we will also study the 
resiliency performance of our proposal against an active attack 
where the attacker uses the disclosed data transferred within 
MWSN. In this new attack model, to strengthen the attacker, it 
will be assumed that the attacker would know about the packets 
with their context that are collected by the mobile sink. With 
this assumption, attacker would also trace route of its own 
packets and would learn about if they are collected and know 
about which sensor nodes have received its packets. 
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